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ABSTRACT 
One of the main issues in the OS security is to provide trusted code execution in an untrusted environment. 
During executing, kernel-mode drivers allocate and process memory data: OS internal structures, users’ 
private information, and sensitive data of third-party drivers. All this data and the drivers code can be 
tampered with by kernel-mode malware. Microsoft security experts integrated new features to fill this gap, 
but they are not enough: allocated data can be stolen and patched and the driver’s code can be dumped 
without any security reaction. The proposed hypervisor-based system (MemoryRanger) tackles this issue by 
executing drivers in separate kernel enclaves with specific memory attributes. MemoryRanger protects code 
and data using Intel VT-x and EPT features with low performance degradation on Windows 10 x64.  
Keywords: hypervisor-based protection, Windows kernel, rootkits, attacks of memory, memory isolation. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Microsoft Windows Operating System has 
dominated on the world's market of desktop and 
laptop computers for more than 30 years. Nowadays 
Windows OS is running on more than one billion 
computers in so many different fields: industries, 
banking, business and government, transport and 
logistics, research, you name it (Warren, 2018). 
Attacks on Windows OSes have always been a 
desirable goal for various malware and rootkits.  
For more than 20 years Windows OS has run in a 
protected mode, provided by the architectures of the 
x86 and x64 processors. This mode includes several 
security features, one of those are four privileged 
levels to protect the system code and data from 
being overwritten by less privileged code. 
According to the Yosifovich, Ionescu, Russinovich, 
& Solomon (2017), Windows OS uses only two 
privileged levels of the protected mode: one for OS 
kernel and drivers (kernel mode) and the other one 
for user applications (user mode).  
Thread model and assumptions. Currently, kernel-
mode drivers share the same memory address space 
with the rest of the OS kernel. All drivers can read 
and write any part of kernel-mode memory without 
any hardware restrictions. This fact makes Windows 
OS to be prone to rootkit attacks and kernel 
exploitation, see Figure 1 (Oh, 2018).  
These malware attacks leverage the same privileged 
level as the OS kernel and can be performed by the 
following (Desimone & Landau, 2018): 
 installing signed malware drivers;  
 exploiting driver vulnerabilities.  
Using kernel-mode code facilities, intruders can 
achieve the following goals (Shirole, 2014):  
 maintain hidden and long-term control of 
the infected computer,  
 escalate privileges;  
 steal users’ data;  
 disrupt industrial processes.  
All of them can be achieved by illegal read and 
write access to the code of drivers’ OS kernel as 
well as tampering with their allocated data. Recent 
examples of these attacks are here (Korkin, 2018-a).  
In the last several years, Microsoft experts have 
integrated a number of security features to protect 
OS kernel from these attacks.  
The oldest implementation is PatchGuard, which 
crashes the OS after revealing some changes of 
internal structures such as EPROCESS unlinking. A 
more recent one is Device Guard, which provides 
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the integrity of all loaded drivers by clearing write 
attributes for all executable memory pages. 
Therefore, any changes of any code loaded into the 
kernel will crash the OS.  
However, it is not enough to prevent kernel mode 
threats. Windows Security features provide neither 
integrity nor confidentiality of the allocated memory 
of the third-party drivers. In addition, the OS 
internal structures are not fully protected, and finally 
the drivers’ code can be dumped and analyzed by 
reverse engineering.  
Cyber security researchers are trying to fill this gap 
and propose various ideas.  
The first memory isolation concept termed 
“Multics” have been proposed by Corbató & 
Vyssotsky (1965) more than half a century ago. It is 
based on creating memory regions with different 
access permissions and was implemented for the GE 
645 mainframe computer.  
Numerous security projects designed for modern 
Intel, AMD, and ARM CPUs have been presented 
and discussed for more than 10 years.  
One recent example is AllMemPro system 
developed by Korkin (2018-a). This hypervisor-
based system protects the data allocated by third-
party drivers and prevents internal structures of 
Windows OS kernel from being patched. At the 
same time, AllMemPro does not provide code 
integrity and confidentiality.  
This paper suggests a new vision of kernel-mode 
memory protection workflow. The idea is to execute 
each driver in a separate memory enclosure. Each 
enclosure has a specific memory configuration:  
 a driver can access the memory pool, which 
it has allocated before;  
 execution of all other drivers is blocked;  
 read and write access to the memory 
allocated by other drivers is blocked.  
While OS works the control has to be switched 
between these enclosures to provide:  
 execution of drivers’ code;  
 prevention of illegal access to the code and 
data.  
The idea of such isolated kernel spaces for drivers 
has been implemented in hypervisor-based system 
called MemoryRanger.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows:  
Section 2 provides a detailed review of existing 
memory protection projects. It also contains the 
comparison table with about 30 research projects 
including Windows built-in solutions.  
Section 3 contains the proposed way of applying 
Extended Page Tables (EPT) to isolate memory. 
This section includes the details of architecture and 
its implementation, benchmark results, and 
limitations outline of MemoryRanger.  
Section 4 focuses on the main conclusions and 
further research directions.  
  
  
a) b) 
Figure 1 Examples of memory access attempts: a) without a malware driver and b) with a malware driver. 
Legitimate access attempts are illustrated as solid green arrows, unauthorized ones as dashed red arrows.  
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2. BACKGROUND  
This section includes analysis of Windows built-in 
tools, research papers, and proof-of-concept 
prototypes that are designed to protect kernel-mode 
memory. All of them will be compared by their 
capabilities to provide both integrity and 
confidentiality for the code of OS and third-party 
drivers as well as for their dynamically allocated 
memory.  
Since Windows XP, released more than 15 years 
ago and still is the 3rd most popular OS for PCs in 
the world (Ghosh, 2017), Microsoft has developed 
a stack of security components and integrated them 
into Windows 10. The components are the 
following: Smart Screen, Application Guard, 
Device Guard, Exploit Guard etc. (ACSC, 2018).  
The Kernel Mode Code Integrity (KMCI), which is 
a part of Device Guard, prevents code modification 
of OS kernel and third-party drivers. It 
automatically resets the write permission bits for 
executable memory pages, so any code 
modifications will immediately cause BSOD with 
bug check code 0xBE.  
Another component is PatchGuard, which protects 
the data of internal structures. It checks the 
integrity of some fields of these structures and 
causes BSOD with bug check code 0x109 after 
revealing an illegal modification. PatchGuard 
prevents, for example, EPROCESS unlinking, but 
skips privileges escalation attacks (Korkin, 2018-a).  
The detailed analysis of Device Guard and 
PatchGuard is here (Korkin, 2018-a). Windows 
security features do not protect memory allocated 
by third-party drivers from being read or 
overwritten, and only partially provide integrity of 
internal Windows structures, see Table 1.  
Security researchers from all around the world are 
trying to fill this gap and protect kernel-mode 
memory. An analysis of projects and prototypes 
will be given according to which memory class and 
from which type of access they protect: 
 a code or assemblies of OS and third-party 
drivers from illegal read- and write- access; 
 data allocated by OS and internal structures 
lists from illegal read- and write- access; 
 data allocated by third-party drivers from 
illegal read- and write- access. 
There are a lot of methods to monitor and prevent 
memory access: hardware-based and software ones; 
based on OS internal features and based on bare-
metal hypervisors. The detailed analysis of all these 
methods are presented in Section 2 Korkin & 
Tanda, (2017).  
This paper is primarily focused on the hypervisor-
based methods, because they have several 
competitive advantages: they are fast, resilient to 
kernel-mode attacks; and work on all modern 
computers.  
Yi et.al. (2017) proposed a fast data anomaly 
detection engine for kernel integrity monitoring 
called DADE. One of the authors’ motivation is to 
prevent the adversary from obtaining the highest 
privilege by attacking the kernel. The main idea is 
to trap memory modifications and check their 
eligibility using backtraces. These backtraces 
include kernel functions that are used to create 
kernel-mode objects. DADE sets the whole kernel 
memory as read only so any write toward a kernel 
memory page generates a page fault, which is 
handled by the hypervisor. To achieve it DADE 
hypervisor leverages Extended Page Tables (EPT) 
functionality supported by hardware virtualization 
extensions. DADE assumes that of OS kernel 
source code is available and it supports only Linux 
OS. DADE prototype was integrated to a KVM 
with Linux OS and tested on ARM Cortex-A15.  
Another hypervisor-based system has been 
proposed by Wang et.al. (2017). Their hypervisor-
based access control strategy (HACS) protects 
security-critical kernel data of Linux OS kernel. 
This hypervisor plays the role of PatchGuard but 
for Ubuntu OS without crashing the OS after 
revealing data modification. HACS detects and 
prevents rootkits with DKOM and Hijack system 
calls attacks. It protects both types of data: static 
kernel data and dynamically allocated kernel data 
using module with whitelist-based access control. 
The key feature of HACS is that it can detect when 
rootkits place malicious code in module’s 
initialization function (.init.text section). HACS 
leverages EPT mechanism to protect memory. It 
prohibits illegal modifications of sensitive data by 
marking the corresponding memory pages as read-
only. HACS hypervisor traps memory access 
violations that occur during write access on these 
pages. After that to process write request, it takes 
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advantage of the processor’s single-step 
interruption mechanism. For the legal request this 
single step helps to allow write access just for one 
instruction. HACS uses only one EPT structure to 
protect OS kernel data. This system needs to 
intercept both legal and illegal access which is time 
consuming. It is implemented on BitVisor for the 
protection of the Ubuntu OS running on an Intel 
Core i7-4790.  
Manes et.al. (2018) addresses the problem of 
rootkit attacks and kernel exploitation by presenting 
a new kernel architecture which securely isolates 
the untrusted kernel extensions. The implemented 
Domain Isolated Kernel (DIKernel) prevents three 
commonly used rootkit techniques:  
 inline hooking; 
 function pointer hooking; 
 DKOM attacks. 
DIKernel enforces memory access isolation by 
separating the kernel extensions from the rest of the 
OS kernel. DIKernel leverages the Domain Access 
Control Register (DACR), which is an ARM CPU 
hardware feature. The authors underline that using 
this feature makes it possible to organize memory 
domains with a very quick switch between them. 
DIKernel is implemented on Linux OS and tested 
on a Raspberry Pi 2 model B.  
Another research focuses on preventing privilege 
escalation attacks (Qiang et.al., 2018). These 
attacks manipulate security-sensitive data in the 
kernel by exploiting memory corruption 
vulnerabilities. The authors underline that these 
non-control-data attacks are able to bypass current 
defense mechanisms. The proposed system called 
PrivGuard monitors the change of the sensitive 
kernel data by modifying the system call entry 
point, before system call entering, and before 
system call returning. PrivGuard is only based on 
OS internal mechanisms without using any 
hypervisor facilities. PrivGuard prototype is 
implemented on Ubuntu OS using x86 architecture.  
Brookes et.al. (2016) consider attacks which 
involve dynamically disassembling kernel code 
stored in memory, privilege escalation, exploit 
artifacts management, and hiding behavior. To 
mitigate these memory disclosure attacks, the 
authors developed ExOShim, a hypervisor-based 
system, which renders all kernel code execute-only. 
The system leverages VT-x and EPT so that the 
hypervisor can install itself under a running kernel, 
which makes it possible to provide the complete 
execute-only memory access control primitives on 
all kernel code pages. By using EPT feature, 
ExOShim loads kernel code on memory frames that 
are marked as non-readable, non-writeable, but also 
executable. This is the entire premise of ExOShim. 
Another feature of ExOShim is self-protection, 
which prevents its code and data from any read, 
write, and execute access. As a result, an attacker 
cannot overcome the protection mechanism even 
trying to install malware hypervisor. ExOShim is a 
lightweight hypervisor for Windows-based OS, 
tested on Intel Core i7-3770k. ExOShim prevents 
kernel-mode code from illegal read and write 
access, and it protects only data needed to maintain 
ExOShim. It does not protect kernel-mode data of 
OS and third-party drivers.  
The issue of providing integrity for the OS kernel 
data structures is considered by the security experts 
from the HP Labs and University of Texas at 
Austin (Hofmann et.al., 2011). The authors 
proposed a hypervisor-based system OSsk to 
prevent several rootkits attacks: hiding a rootkit 
process by removing its structure from the list and 
changing function pointers to the custom functions. 
The developed prototype OSsk protects the kernel 
data structures by verifying their content in a thread 
that runs concurrently with the guest execution. 
OSck protects the system call table through 
hardware page protection and a hypervisor call 
ensuring that once the table is initialized, the guest 
OS may not modify it. OSsk is implemented as a 
part of KVM hypervisor on the Intel Core i7 860 
using Linux OS. 
Another project leveraged hardware-virtualization 
technology and EPT feature of CPU is the InkTag 
hypervisor (Hofmann et.al., 2013). It allows 
executing trusted user-mode applications under an 
untrusted operating system. InkTag runs trusted 
applications in a special high-assurance process 
(HAP) which is isolated from the OS. InkTag 
provides a special hypercall to HAP to verify the 
runtime behavior of the OS. InkTag hypervisor 
ensures privacy and integrity for the code and data 
in a HAP’s address space through encryption and 
hashing, and verifies that those services work 
correctly. InkTag is developed on the top of KVM 
hypervisor and tested using Linux OS on an Intel 
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Core i7 860. Although InkTag does not prevent any 
attacks on kernel memory, its concept seems very 
interesting and promising for OS security. 
Security researchers from China proposed a 
pattern-based system to check integrity of the OS 
kernel (Feng et.al., 2018). Their system BehaviorKI 
extracts a set of patterns which characterize 
malicious behaviors. During the implementation of 
BehaviorKI the authors utilize hardware-assisted 
virtualization and EPT features designed for 
memory virtualization. Their behavior-triggered 
system inspects whether the OS critical components 
are modified illegally including static and dynamic 
components. The authors designed a testbed to 
imitate malicious behavior by extracting frequent 
event sequences from malware attacks. The 
researchers underline that “dynamic non-control 
data structures store critical information and user 
identification data” and emphasize that “integrity is 
very important to the security of the computer 
system”. To reduce the performance penalty, 
BehaviorKI controls memory access events only for 
critical memory regions. This system also controls 
register operations and those involving system 
calls. BehaviorKI provides integrity for the 
following OS components: kernel code and static 
kernel data, dynamic kernel data including control-
flow and non-control data. One example of 
dynamic kernel data is the head of LKM list, which 
is used by rootkits to hide themselves. To verify 
whether kernel integrity has been tampered, 
BehaviorKI uses kernel data invariants defined via 
kernel source code analysis and OS runtime 
snapshots. This system intercepts memory access 
operations by utilizing EPT violations and 
“removing the readable or writable permission to 
the monitored memory pages from the EPT entry”. 
BehaviorKI processes these events by setting Trap 
Flag (TF) and recovers these pages to be readable 
and writable. During dispatching, the trap debug 
exception BehaviorKI blocks the permission to the 
monitored pages and clears TF to make the system 
run normally. The key feature of BehaviorKI is that 
it triggers integrity checking only when the event 
sequences match malicious behavior patterns. As a 
result, it has a lower performance overhead due to 
integrity checking compared to event-triggered 
approaches. The authors implemented BehaviorKI 
prototype on top of Xen hypervisor and tested it 
using the Intel Core i7-4710MQ and Linux OS.  
LKMG is one of the most long-running research 
projects, dealing with the OS kernel protection 
against vulnerable loadable kernel modules (LMG). 
The researchers from the USA and China have been 
developing their prototype of LKM guard (LKMG) 
for more than 7 years (Tian et.al., 2011; Tian et.al., 
2018). The authors consider that vulnerable LKM 
can modify any kernel data and code, call kernel 
functions, and read sensitive information. To 
protect OS from these attacks the authors utilize 
static analysis to extract the kernel code and data 
access patterns from kernel module’s source codes 
and then generate a security policy by combining 
these patterns with the related memory address 
information. Also the authors isolate kernel module 
from the rest of the OS and enforce its execution by 
using hardware virtualization technology. The 
security policy is developed according to the 
principle of least privilege: an LKM can only 
access the kernel data that are necessary for its 
functioning. LKMG applies two EPT structures to 
mediate memory access: one EPT for the LKM and 
another one for the OS kernel. LKMG supports 
allocated memory protection by intercepting the 
allocation and deallocation functions. For the 
dynamic allocated data, LKMG prevents illegal 
read- and write- access. Another LKMG feature is 
kernel stack protection. LKMG protects the data 
allocated by the OS from being read and 
overwritten by LKM. It also guarantees the 
integrity of the OS kernel code. However, LKMG 
does not restrict the OS kernel, it can read and 
modify LKM code and data. One of the main issues 
of this guard is that it requires OS and LKM source 
code and does not support kernel protection when 
its source code is not available. The proposed 
policy-centric approach is implemented using Xen 
hypervisor and is developed for Linux OS running 
on Intel Xeon X3430. The authors assume that 
LKMG can be applied for Windows-based OS also. 
Another project that performs integrity checking of 
the Linux OS kernel and has a similar name with 
the previous one is Linux Kernel Runtime Guard, 
or LKRG, developed by Zabrocki (2018). This 
project is designed to protect OS kernel against 
attacks via kernel vulnerabilities. LKRG performs 
post-detection and responds to unauthorized 
modifications of the Linux OS kernel and processes 
credentials. This guard provides OS kernel integrity 
and exploit detection. LKRG is currently in an 
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early experimental stage of the development and it 
seems quite promising.  
An interesting idea of providing integrity of the OS 
kernel code and data suggested by Kwon et.al. 
(2018). To avoid two-stage paging overhead 
authors implemented Hypernel security framework 
which relies on special hardware as well as a new 
software module called Hypersec. The hardware 
module called memory bus monitor (MBM), 
connects to the system bus between the CPU and 
main memory. MBM monitors write operations to 
every memory word and raises an interrupt upon 
finding any write attempt to the sensitive data. 
However, this bus monitor cannot be aware of the 
memory addresses of dynamically allocated kernel 
data objects, it can only be applied for monitoring 
limited kernel objects. The Hypernel prototype is 
implemented on the Versatile Express Juno r1 
Platform running Linux OS.  
EPTI developed by Hua et.el. (2018) is one of the 
recent hypervisor-based projects focused on kernel-
mode memory leakage prevention. This project 
deals with the protection of the cloud computing 
systems against Meltdown Attack. This recently 
discovered attack makes it possible to dump the 
kernel code and data from user-mode applications. 
One of the main features of EPTI is the allocatation 
and switching between two EPT structures to 
isolate user space and kernel space. Another key 
feature is that EPTI overhead is quite low because 
each EPT structure has its own TLB and as a result, 
switching between EPTs does not flush TLB. The 
authors reveal one interesting fact during 
performing a real Meltdown Attack: they found 
“that although Meltdown can read the memory 
without access permission it cannot fetch code 
without executable permission even in reorder-
execution”. EPTI leverages this fact in the 
following way: all user memory has been mapped 
as execute-never in the corresponding EPT. EPTI 
prototype has been implemented on Linux OS 
running on Intel Core i7-7700.  
Providing kernel integrity is also important even for 
smartphone OSes running on ARM CPUs. Ge, 
et.al. (2014) assume that OS kernel includes at least 
one exploitable vulnerability, which can be used by 
an adversary to hijack the control flow or to launch 
ROP attack. To prevent this attack the Sprobes 
system has been designed. This system provides 
kernel mode code integrity and prevents memory 
modifications caused by rootkits by using hardware 
extension ARM TrustZone. This makes it possible 
to partition all system resources and protect the 
confidentiality and integrity of all computations. 
Sprobes is implemented for Linux OS running on 
ARM Cortex M15.  
The idea of using several different EPT paging 
structures to protect critical memory areas from 
kernel-mode malware has been implemented in the 
LAKEED system by Tian et.al. (2017). This system 
is specifically designed to prevent the kernel-level 
keyloggers from accessing the user buffer that 
contains the keystrokes. Authors assume that 
Windows OS kernel mainly utilizes two kernel 
modules to drive a keyboard, and to protect the 
page with keystrokes, they allocate three separate 
EPTs for the two keyboard drivers and one for the 
target kernel extension. All these three EPTs have 
the same memory mapping but with different 
access permissions: the target extension can only 
access its own memory region and cannot access 
the code and data region of the keyboard drivers. In 
the keyboard driver spaces both of the two drivers 
can access each other’s data region in addition to 
their own code and data regions. LAKEED also 
prevents drivers’ code mutual access as well as 
preventing access to the code and data of the target 
kernel extension. LAKEED is tested using Intel 
Xeon E5606 CPU for Windows OS. LAKEED 
protects limited kernel data buffers, which are 
related only to the keystrokes but demonstrates the 
possibility of using hypervisor with EPT support to 
isolate both code and data. One of interesting facts 
of LAKEED implementation is that it works well 
with filter drivers with minimal overhead. This fact 
demonstrates the possibility to use various EPT 
structures to isolate all filter drivers.  
He et.al. (2017) is concerned about the security 
issue of attacking sensitive applications by 
exploiting kernel vulnerabilities. This issue makes 
sense for the current OSes, which use large 
monolithic kernel, because the kernel has complete 
access and control to/over all system resources 
including memory, device, and file management. In 
order to prevent kernel-mode attacks, the authors 
proposed a security-sensitive application (SSApp) 
protection mechanism called TZ-SSAP. This secure 
mechanism is based on a hardware-assisted 
environment provided by TrustZone technology on 
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ARM CPU. TZ-SSAP protects the code integrity by 
modifying the access permissions for kernel 
memory pages and traps all updates. TZ-SSAP 
protects the integrity and security of kernel data: it 
maps static data with read-only attributes as the 
kernel mode; and makes dynamic data write-
protected since it may be changed. TZ-SSAP has 
been tested on malware LKM that tries to directly 
tamper code and static data in the kernel space, as 
well as taking advantage of its privileges. The 
experimental results show that TZ-SSAP can 
prevent those attacks quite effectively. This system 
has been implemented for the ARM-Linux OS 
running on the ARM CoreTile Express A9x4 board.  
A recently presented research project at the Black 
Hat USA 2017 conference focused on preventing 
modern OSes from being exploited using ROP 
payload, “just-in-time” ROP or JIT-ROP (Pomonis 
et.al., 2017). During these attacka, the exploit 
pinpoints the exact location of ROP gadget and 
assembles them on-the-fly into a functional JIT-
ROP. The authors assume unprivileged local 
attacks, which may overwrite kernel code pointers 
with the OS via buggy kernel interfaces. To prevent 
these attacks, they present a kernel hardening 
scheme based on execute-only memory and code 
diversification called kR^X. This system includes 
two main parts: the R^X policy, and fine-grained 
KASLR. The R^X memory policy imposes the 
following property: memory can be either readable 
or executable. Fine-grained KASLR refers to a set 
of code diversification techniques specifically 
tailored to the kernel setting. This system helps to 
provide self-protection of execute-only kernel 
memory. kR^X prototype is implemented for the 
x86-64 Linux OS running on Intel Core i7-6700K 
CPU.  
The issues of detecting illegal memory access have 
been considered in the system DigTool which is 
designed to detect various kernel-mode 
vulnerabilities (Pan et.al., 2017). This system can 
identify out-of-bounds, use-after-free, and time-of-
check-to-time-of-use vulnerabilities for both kernel 
code and device drivers for Windows 7 and 10. 
DigTool leverages hypervisor facilities to monitor 
memory access by clearing the present flag (P flag) 
on the pages, which need to be monitored and 
processes page fault exceptions, which are 
triggered after any access to this page. DigTool 
enables the “single-step” operation by setting MTF 
(or TF) to trace access to this page. The authors 
focus on the two goals of illegal memory abuse: 
accessing beyond the bounds of the allocated heaps 
and referencing to already freed memory. To 
process all these events, DigTool hooks Windows 
allocation and deallocation functions: 
ExAllocatePoolWithTag, ExFreePoolWithTag, 
RtlAllocateHeap, and RtlFreeHeap. To prevent 
specifically UAF vulnerability DigTool also hooks 
InterlockedPushEntrySList and 
InterlockedPopEntrySList to be able to monitor the 
freed memory blocks in the lookaside lists. DigTool 
prevents read and write access to the freed memory 
and bounds of allocated pools.  
Wang et.al. (2015) highlighted that modern OS 
kernels are too complicated to be secure because 
they consist of tens of millions of lines of source 
code. Consequently, an increasingly large number 
of vulnerabilities are discovered in all major OS 
kernels each year. The proposed SecPod framework 
provides a trusted execution environment by 
creating a dedicated address space or secure space 
in parallel to the existing kernel address space or 
the normal space. The authors considered attacks 
resulting in illegal modifications of the page table 
attributes. The secure space is designed to enforce 
memory isolation by sanitizing the guest page table 
updates. The authors have tested their solution 
using two various attacks: under execution of 
unauthorized code and under tampering data. To 
deal with the first scenario SecPod registers a call 
back function for kernel page updates. As a result, 
after a new executable page is created in the kernel 
mode, SecPod verifies the hashes of code pages. If 
the verification is correct, the page is marked as 
executable in the shadow page table. Otherwise, it 
detects an attempt to execute an unauthorized 
kernel code. For the second scenario, SecPod 
applies data invariants, which are used to prevent 
kernel data structures from being intricately 
interconnected. SecPod is developed using KVM 
hypervisor and the EPT feature, which the authors 
called NPT. This system is tested using Ubuntu OS 
running on Intel Core i5 CPU.  
Hypervisor-based security solutions can be used to 
protect against physical attacks on main memory, 
such as cold boot attacks (Götzfried et.al., 2016). 
Intel SGX is one of the newly integrated 
technologies focused on the restriction of memory 
access. This technology leverages enclaves, but it is 
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only suitable to protect user mode memory. Kernel 
mode space cannot be protected by Intel’s SGX. To 
tackle this issue the authors developed HyperCrypt, 
which prevents physical attacks on kernel and user 
memory by leveraging VT-x with EPT (SLAT) 
technologies and AES symmetric encryption. 
HyperCrypt encrypts host physical pages and 
automatically decrypts pages that are currently 
accessed by the guest OS. HyperCrypt uses the 
CPU-bound encryption principle to prevent 
cryptographic keys and key material from being 
stored in RAM. HyperCrypt prototype is developed 
on top of BitVisor and is tested on Linux OS. 
HyperCrypt is not designed to prevent kernel 
memory from the kernel code access. Still the idea 
to prevent physical attacks, such as cold boot, using 
only software facilities seems very promising.  
Srivastava et.al. (2009) underline that kernel 
components of the commodity monolithic OS, like 
Windows and Linux, share a unified address space 
that allows any component to access the data and 
code. Malicious kernel-level components can hide 
their own presence by illicitly removing OS data 
structures and can escalate process privileges by 
overwriting the process’ user credentials with those 
for a root or administrative user. The authors 
presented the system called Sentry, which prevents 
kernel components with low trust by altering 
security critical data used by the kernel. Their 
system focuses primarily on the protection of 
dynamically allocated data structures. The authors 
assume that the core kernel code is protected and 
cannot be subverted by any malware. Their 
hypervisor-based design mediates the memory 
access attempts to overwrite protected data into the 
kernel address space. Sentry partitions kernel 
memory into two parts: protected and unprotected. 
It mediates memory access by using memory page 
protection bits. As a result, both legitimate and 
malicious writes to the protected pages will cause a 
page fault received by Sentry. Sentry determines 
the initiator of the access to protected data by using 
records on the kernel stack at every access. Its 
mechanism verifies memory access at the 
granularity of high-level language variables in the 
kernel’s source code. Sentry does not provide 
privacy of allocated data and of the drivers’ code 
and requires the drivers’ source code. Sentry is 
developed using XEN and Linux OS kernel.  
Lin et.al. (2007) underline that the primary cause of 
most OS failures are errors in device drivers written 
by third-party vendors. They point out that a 
malicious device driver can crash the whole OS or 
compromise its integrity because of unrestricted 
access to its resources. They proposed a system 
called iKernel to protect a kernel OS from both 
buggy and malicious device drivers. This system is 
designed to provide strong isolation mechanisms 
for device drivers using hypervisor-assisted virtual 
machine technology. The idea behind is the device 
drives isolation using separate virtual machines. As 
a result, the crash of the driver will affect only its 
virtual machine without affecting the host kernel or 
other virtual machines. This system isolates access 
to I/O ports and memory-mapped registers. iKernel 
does not provide integrity and privacy for the data 
allocated by the third-party driver. The system is 
developed using KVM virtual machine and Linux 
OS.  
The research work presented by Chen et.al. (2017) 
is focused on the fact that commodity OS kernels 
are typically implemented using low-level unsafe 
languages. As a result, memory corruption 
vulnerabilities are quite common and inevitable 
security weakness of modern OS kernels. Their 
research considers memory corruption of non-
control kernel data such as process credentials data. 
The system PrivWatcher is developed to protect the 
integrity of process credentials from these attacks 
using dual reference monitor which guarantees the 
Time-of-Check-To-Time-of-Use (TOCTTOU) 
consistency protected data fields. This system 
provides Discretionary Access Control (DAC) 
policy and prevents unauthorized processes from 
elevating their privileges. PrivWatcher does not 
protect kernel code and data allocated by 
third-party drivers from being read or patched. This 
framework has been implemented using Linux OS 
kernel with KSM.  
Another security system presented by Azab et.el. 
(2014) relies on hardware features of the ARM to 
prevent attacks that aim to do the following:  
 inject malicious code into the kernel;  
 modify privileged code binaries that 
already exist in memory.  
The proposed TrustZone-based Real-time Kernel 
Protection (TZ-RKP) provides OS kernel isolation 
using ARM Trust-Zone. TZ-RKP completely 
9 
protects the kernel code base, but does not prevent 
attacks that trick the kernel into maliciously 
modifying its own data. This system is 
implemented using Android’s Linux Kernel. 
One more security system focused on providing 
code integrity of software running on commodity 
hardware has been presented by Zhang et.al. 
(2014). The proposed HyperCheck is a hardware-
assisted integrity monitor, which successfully 
detects rootkits and code integrity attacks. 
HyperCheck prevents attacks on both targets: OS 
kernels, such as Linux and Windows and 
hypervisors, such as XEN. HyperCheck relies on 
the CPU System Management Mode (SMM) to 
acquire and transmit the state of the protected 
machine to an external machine. This system 
guarantees OS kernel code integrity only, without 
providing any protection against allocated data.  
A group of security experts from Belgium 
(Gadaleta et.al., 2012) presented HyperForce, a 
hypervisor-based framework, which guarantees the 
execution of critical code in the kernel-space 
regardless of the state of the kernel, even if the OS 
kernel has been compromised. The authors 
assumed that a kernel-level attacker can modify the 
critical code in order to compromise its efficiency 
or completely disable its operations. To provide 
kernel-mode code integrity, HyperForce takes the 
advantages of hardware-based virtualization and 
write-protects the memory pages holding the 
instructions and data of the security-critical code. 
This framework allows the code to make changes to 
its data by unlocking the memory pages before it 
triggers an interrupt, and then lock them back 
immediately after the code’s execution. HyperForce 
also write-protects the memory holding the 
Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) and protects the 
Interrupt Descriptor Table Register (IDTR) that 
contains the address of the IDT. HyperForce has 
been implemented using KVM and Linux OS 
kernel. HyperForce does not protect third-party 
drivers and memory allocated by them.  
Another hypervisor-based framework was 
presented at Black Hat Asia by Han et.al. (2017). 
The proposed integrity protector Shadow-box 
supports periodic and event-based monitoring of 
kernel objects. Shadow-box recognizes integrity 
breaches in static and dynamic kernel objects. 
Shadow-box relies upon its two sub-parts: a 
lightweight hypervisor (Light-box) and a security 
monitor (Shadow-watcher). The Light-box is a 
lightweight hypervisor, which isolates OS kernel 
and dynamic kernel objects. The security monitor 
Shadow-watcher monitors static kernel elements 
and checks the integrity of dynamic kernel 
elements. Shadow-box protects the integrity of 
static kernel objects: code and data by setting read 
and execute rights for the code and only read rights 
for read-only data. This framework does not 
provide code privacy as well as security for the 
third-party drivers code and their data.  
To protect commodity OS kernels from untrusted 
kernel extensions Xi, Tian, & Liu (2011) proposed 
HUKO, a hypervisor-based integrity protection 
system. This system leverages mandatory access 
control policies to limit an attacker’s ability to 
compromise the kernel integrity. HUKO protects 
code, static data and dynamic data of the OS kernel 
from being modified.  
SIDE is another system, which isolates the kernel 
from buggy device drivers developed by Sun and 
Chiueh (2011). SIDE executes a device driver in 
the same address space as the kernel but in a 
different protection domain from the kernel.  
Conclusion. The conducted analysis of the related 
research projects shows that there are numerous 
hardware-based virtualization prototypes for Linux 
and Windows OS designed to prevent malicious 
kernel mode code from accessing code and 
sensitive data in the kernel memory. At the same 
time, not one of the existing solutions provide code 
and data protection for both OS kernel and third-
party drivers, see Table 1.  
Several projects leverage Intel EPT technology to 
create isolated enclaves for drivers, for example:  
 one EPT used in HACS by Wang et.al. 
(2017), and AllMemPro by Korkin (2018-a); 
 two EPTs used in LKMG by Tian et.al. 
(2018), and EPTI by Hua et.el. (2018);  
 three EPTs used in LAKEED by Tian et.al. 
(2017); 
EPT technology seems very capable of creating 
isolated kernel spaces; the detailed analysis of this 
possibility will be presented further.  
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Table 1. Summary table of memory protection projects  
Title, year 
Unauthorized access to the following memory: 
OS 
Code for OS Kernel 
and 3rd party drivers 
Data of OS 
internal structures 
Data of 3rd 
party drivers 
Read Write Read Write Read Write 
Windows built-in 
Protection, 20181 
– + – + – – Windows 
Multics, 19652 – + – + – – GE 645  
Sentry, 2009 – + – + – + Linux 
iKernel, 2007 – + – + – – Linux 
HUKO, 2011 – + – + – – 
Linux, 
Windows 
OSsk, 2011 – + – + – – Linux 
HyperForce, 2012 – + – – – – Linux 
HyperCheck, 2014 – + – – – – 
Linux, 
Windows 
HyperCrypt, 20163 – – – – – – Linux 
Hypernel, 20184 – + – + – – Linux 
PrivWatcher, 2017 – – – + – – Linux 
PrivGuard, 20185 – – – + – – Linux 
TZ-RKP, 2014 – + – – – – Linux 
TZ-SSAP, 2017 + – – – – – Linux 
SIDE, 2013 – + – + – + Linux 
Sprobes, 2014 – + – – – – Linux 
SecPod, 2015 – – – + – – Linux 
ExOShim, 2016 + + – – – – Windows 
LAKEED, 20166 + + + + – – Windows 
Shadow-box, 2017 – + – + – – Linux 
kR^X, 2017 + + – – – – Linux 
Digtool, 20177 – – + + – – Windows 
DADE, 2017 – + – + – – Linux 
HACS, 2017 – – – + – – Linux 
DIKernel, 2018 – + – + – – Linux 
BehaviourKI, 2018 – + – + – – Linux 
LKRG, 2018 – + – + – – Linux 
LKMG, 2018 – + + + + + Linux 
EPTI, 2018 + – + – + – Linux 
AllMemPro, 2018 – – + + + + Windows 
MemoryRanger, 20188 + + + + + + Windows 
                                                     
1 PatchGuard protects only limited fields of OS internal structures. 
2 Multics is the first concept of memory isolation for the General Electric (GE) 645 mainframe computer.  
3 HyperCrypt prevents physical attacks such as cold boot via kernel encryption. 
4 Hypernel monitors limited kernel objects. 
5 PrivGuard prevents only privilege escalation attacks. 
6 LAKEED protects memory data related to the keystrokes. 
7 Digtool prevents accessing beyond the bounds of allocated heaps and referencing to freed memory.  
8 MemoryRanger is the proposed memory protection system 
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3. THE MEMORYRANGER: HOW TO RUN 
DRIVERS IN ISOLATED KERNEL SPACES 
The proposed prototype Memory Ranger is based 
on Intel Virtualization Technology (Intel VT-x) 
and extended page-table mechanism (EPT). This 
chapter includes four subsections. The first one 
deals with how to apply VT-x and EPT to isolate 
drivers. The second one presents the architecture 
of MemoryRanger and its implementation. The 
next section deals with MemoryRanger 
benchmark results. The final section discusses its 
limitations.  
3.1. EPT: The Idea of Memory Isolation 
Extended Page Tables (EPT) is an Intel 
virtualization technology for the memory 
management unit (MMU) which is designed to 
virtualize guest physical memory (Intel, 2018).  
EPT Intro. The central part of this mechanism is 
the EPT paging structures, which are used during 
memory translation. According to the section 
28.2 of the Intel manual (Intel, 2018), guest-
physical addresses are translated by traversing a 
set of EPT paging structures to produce physical 
addresses that are used to access memory. 
Without EPT the guest-physical addresses will be 
treated as physical addresses and used to access 
host memory. The address of EPT paging 
structures is stored in the hypervisor control 
structure (VMCS).  
In a nutshell, EPT plays the role of an 
intermediary or proxy during memory address 
translation.  
The organization of EPT paging structures is 
similar to the paging structures in the protected 
mode.  
A detailed analysis of applying EPT to monitor 
code execution and control memory access has 
been presented in Section 2.2.2. by Korkin & 
Tanda (2017). The details of using EPT for 
protection of allocated data are given in 
Section 3.1. by Korkin (2018-a).  
EPT provides an opportunity to trap and process 
each access on the memory page by manipulating 
the content of EPT page-table entry.  
It is possible to intercept read, write, and execute 
memory access attempts by changing the 
corresponding access attributes on EPT entry as 
well as redirecting necessary memory access 
from the original physical page to the fake one by 
changing page frame number (PFN) value in this 
EPT entry.  
Memory Isolation using EPT. The previous 
research projects show that it is possible to 
initially allocate fixed EPT paging structures with 
different access attributes and prevent memory 
access from kernel-mode drivers by switching 
between them, for example three EPTs are used 
in LAKEED by Tian et.al. (2017).  
The key idea of MemoryRanger is to dynamically 
allocate EPT paging structures and update access 
attributes on EPT page-table entries in real time.  
For example, let us consider the following initial 
scenario. OS Windows is running: OS kernel 
code and other drivers are loaded into memory. 
OS kernel code accesses OS structures and other 
drivers access their memory.  
After that, driver A is loaded, allocates the 
memory data A by calling 
nt!ExAllocatePoolWithTag routine and accesses 
this newly allocated memory buffer. Next, Driver 
B is loaded, allocates data B and accesses this 
data in a similar way.  
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Figure 2. Organization of EPT paging structures to isolate memory of two kernel-mode drivers and their allocated memory  
 
OS kernel code accesses the memory of drivers A and B during its 
loading. Next, OS code accesses the allocated memory of these drivers 
during the ExAllocatePoolWithTag call. In this scenario, OS kernel has 
not been restricted, but it can still be restricted.  
All the aforementioned three access from drivers to their data are legal 
and they are marked as horizontal lines, see left part of the Figure 2.  
Let us consider the following illegal memory access attempts: 
 Driver A does the following:  
o Patches the OS structures;  
o Steals and modifies data B;  
o Dumps the Driver B;  
 Driver B does the following: 
o Patches the OS structures;  
o Steals and modifies data A;  
o Dumps the Driver A;  
 Other drivers do the following:  
o Steal and modify data A and data B;  
o Dump drivers A and B.  
Without MemoryRanger all these illegal memory access attempts are 
processed without any security reaction. To prevent these attacks 
MemoryRanger allocates EPT structure for each driver in the following 
way, see the central and the right parts of the Figure 2.  
Me m oryRange r Hype rvis or
Other Drivers and Their Memory
exe = false        rw = true
OS kernel code
(e.g. ntoskrnl)
exe = true
rw = true
Driver A
exe = true
rw = true
Allocated Mem A
exe = true
rw = true
Now all drivers share the same space
Driver B
exe = true
rw = true
Allocated Mem B
exe = true
rw = true
OS structures 
(e.g. EPROCESS)
exe = true         
rw = true
Other Drivers and Their Memory
exe = true        rw = true
EPT pointer
 read/
write 
 read/
write 
read
Driver A
exe = false
rw = false
Allocated Mem A
exe = false
rw = false
Default EPT structure
Driver B
exe = false
rw = false
Allocated Mem B
exe = false
rw = false
Other Drivers and Their Memory
exe = true        rw = true
Access 
prevention
OS kernel code
(e.g. ntoskrnl)
exe = true
rw = true
Driver A
exe = true
rw = true
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exe = true
rw = true
EPT structure for Driver A
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exe = false
rw = false
Allocated Mem B
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rw = false
OS structures 
(e.g. EPROCESS)
exe = false
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 read/
write 
Access 
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OS kernel code
(e.g. ntoskrnl)
exe = true
rw = true
Driver A
exe = false
rw = false
Allocated Mem A
exe = false
rw = false
EPT structure for Driver B
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exe = true
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Allocated Mem B
exe = true
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OS structures 
(e.g. EPROCESS)
exe = false         
rw = false
 read/
write 
Access 
prevention
   Execute violation: MemoryRanger 
changes EPT pointer so that the code continues 
its execution
 read/
write 
OS kernel code
(e.g. ntoskrnl)
exe = true
rw = true
OS structures 
(e.g. EPROCESS)
exe = true         
rw = true
 read/
write 
Access 
prevention
Other Drivers and Their Memory
exe = false        rw = true
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Step 1. The Default EPT. Let us assume that 
MemoryRanger is loaded as a common driver 
before Driver A and Driver B will be loaded.  
After its loading, MemoryRanger allocates the first 
EPT structure called the Default EPT. 
MemoryRanger places OS inside this EPT by 
setting the memory access attributes: the OS kernel 
code, OS structures, other drivers and their memory 
is executable and readable/writable. By default, 
memory pages of all newly allocated EPT 
structures are non-executable, but readable and 
writable.  
MemoryRanger receives notifications about drivers 
loading, the process creation, and memory 
allocation/deallocation by the third-party driver.  
Step 2. Creating EPT for Driver A. After 
trapping the loading of the Driver A, 
MemoryRanger creates a new EPT structure for 
Driver A with the following access attributes:  
 Memory of Driver A is marked as 
executable and readable/writable;  
 OS kernel code is marked as executable 
and readable/writable;  
 OS structures memory is marked as non-
executable and non-readable/non-writable; 
 Other drivers and their memory are marked 
as non-executable, but readable/writable. 
Additionally, MemoryRanger updates access 
attributes for the Default EPT structure: 
 Memory of driver A is marked as non-
executable and non-readable/non-writable. 
Step 3. Updating two EPTs. After Driver A 
allocates memory A, MemoryRanger updates 
access attributes for two EPTs.  
The EPT structure for Driver A gets the following 
updates:  
 Allocated memory A is marked as 
executable and readable/writable.  
The Default EPT structure updates in this way:  
 Allocated memory A is marked as non-
executable and non-readable/non-writable.  
As a result, Driver A is executed and accesses its 
allocated memory A only in the EPT for Driver A. 
Access to these memory regions from the Default 
EPT is forbidden.  
Step 4. Creating EPT for Driver B. 
MemoryRanger traps the loading of the Driver B. 
MemoryRanger creates a new EPT structure for 
Driver B with the following access attributes:  
 Memory of Driver B is marked as 
executable and readable/writable;  
 OS kernel code is marked as executable 
and readable/writable;  
 Memory of Driver A is marked as non-
executable and non-readable/non-writable; 
 OS structures memory is marked as non-
executable and non-readable/non-writable; 
 Other drivers and their memory are marked 
as non-executable, but readable/writable. 
Additionally, MemoryRanger updates access 
attributes for the Default EPT structure and EPT for 
Driver A in the following way:  
 Memory of Driver B is marked as non-
executable and non-readable/non-writable. 
Step 5. Updating three EPTs. After Driver B 
allocates memory B, MemoryRanger updates all 
EPTs in the following way.  
For the EPT structure for Driver B: 
 Allocated memory B is marked as 
executable and readable/writable.  
For the Default EPT structure: 
 Allocated memory B is marked as non-
executable and non-readable/non-writable.  
For the EPT structure for Driver A: 
 Allocated memory B is marked as non-
executable and non-readable/non-writable. 
As a result, Driver B is executed and accesses its 
allocated memory B only in the EPT for Driver B. 
Access to these memory regions from the Default 
EPT and EPT for Driver A is forbidden. 
Step 6. A new process. MemoryRanger is also 
notified when a new process is created. After that it 
reveals the memory address of EPROCESS 
structure and updates this memory for all EPTs in 
the following way.  
For the Default EPT structure: 
 EPROCESS structure is marked as 
executable and readable/writable.  
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For the EPT structures for Driver A and Driver B: 
 EPROCESS structure is marked as non-
executable and non-readable/non-writable.  
As a result, only OS kernel and other drivers can 
access the newly loaded EPROCESS structure from 
the Default EPT. Access to this memory from all 
other EPTs and from Driver A (Driver B) is 
forbidden.  
Step 7. Switching between EPTs. Windows OS 
kernel controls drivers’ execution using the thread 
scheduling mechanism. The system’s thread 
scheduler interrupts kernel-mode thread and moves 
control to another thread (Microsoft, 2004).  
Initially, EPT pointer includes the address of the 
Default EPT. Each time after the OS scheduler 
moves control to Driver A (or to Driver B) it tries 
to execute the driver’s code and causes an execute 
EPT violation. MemoryRanger traps this EPT 
violation, because the corresponding code 
fragments are marked as non-executable. After 
trapping, MemoryRanger checks which driver is 
executed and changes the EPT pointer to the EPT 
for Driver A (or to the EPT for Driver B) so that the 
code continues its execution, see Figure 3.  
If during execution of Driver A inside the EPT for 
Driver A the OS scheduler moves control to one of 
other drivers, its execution leads to the execute EPT 
violation, because other drivers code fragments are 
marked as non-executable in EPT for Driver A (and 
in EPT for Driver B as well). MemoryRanger traps 
the EPT violation and after deciding which code 
tries to execute, changes EPT pointer to the Default 
EPT structure.  
In a similar way, MemoryRanger changes EPT 
pointer if OS kernel code accesses OS structures 
inside EPT for Driver A (or EPT for Driver B). 
Memory regions with OS structures are marked as 
non-readable/non-writeable inside these EPTs and 
access to the memory always cause EPT violations. 
This access is granted only inside the Default EPT.  
The Final Step. Preventing illegal access. Apart 
from executing EPT violations, MemoryRanger 
also traps read and write EPT violations. 
MemoryRanger provides the principle of the 
minimal privilege: the read and write access to the 
data is granted only to the drivers, which allocated 
this data before. The examples of legal access are 
the following: 
In the Default EPT: 
 OS kernel core accesses OS structure;  
 Other drivers access their memory;  
In the EPT for Driver A (in the EPT for Driver B): 
 Driver A accesses allocated memory A 
(Driver B accesses allocated memory B). 
All other memory access attempts are trapped and 
assumed as illegal with one exception. After 
trapping the EPT violations MemoryRanger 
decides to grant or prevent an access and 
implements this decision, see Figure 3. The 
decision is made according to the following 
parameters:  
 the current value of EPT pointer;  
 source address (which code tries to access);  
 destination or target address (which data is 
accessed);  
 type of access (read or write).  
For illegal access, for example, Driver A tries to 
access memory of Driver B or Driver B tries to 
patch OS internal structures, MemoryRanger 
processes the following steps to prevent an access:  
 Redirects access by changing EPT PFN 
value from the original page to the fake 
one;  
 Allows access to this page by changing 
EPT memory access attributes;  
 Sets Monitor Trap Flag (MTF).  
As a result, after a driver reads the fake data the 
control goes to the hypervisor again. Now 
MemoryRanger puts the original settings back:  
 Restores access by setting EPT PFN value 
to the original page;  
 Blocks access to this page by changing 
EPT memory access attributes;  
 Clears MTF.  
These manipulations prevent illegal access to the 
sensitive data and code.  
15 
 
Figure 3. The proposed algorithm of dispatching EPT violations in MemoryRanger (general view) 
 
The access exception. The legal read/write 
memory access can result in EPT violation as well. 
This exception to the rule is based on memory 
paging. Windows memory management system can 
allocate memory for two various drivers in the 
same 4 kilobyte memory page. As a result, 
MemoryRanger blocks any access to this memory 
in all EPT structures.  
After the driver tries to access such a memory data, 
which is allocated by this driver earlier, 
MemoryRanger traps it. During processing of this 
violation, MemoryRanger decides that this is legal 
access and temporarily makes this data accessible: 
 Allows access to this page by changing 
EPT memory access attributes;  
 Sets MTF.  
After a driver accesses this memory, the control 
goes to the hypervisor again, and now it 
implements the following steps to protect memory: 
 Blocks access to this page by changing 
EPT memory access attributes;  
 Clears MTF.  
These steps help to grant authorized access as well 
as protecting data buffers, which were allocated at 
the same memory page.  
At the same time, this temporary access granting is 
very time-consuming. There are several ways of 
avoiding this issue; one of them is to allocate only 
page-aligned memory.  
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Conclusion. To sum up, MemoryRanger (MR) 
isolates drivers execution by leveraging EPT in the 
following way:  
 Initially MR allocates the Default EPT 
structure. All loaded drivers and OS kernel 
are executed inside it.  
 After a new driver is loaded, MR allocates 
a new EPT structure with a specific 
configuration. MR updates all EPT settings 
so that only this new driver and OS kernel 
can be executed here.  
 Each time the driver allocates memory MR 
updates all EPT structures again.  
 MR updates all EPT structures after a new 
process has been launched.  
 MR provides drives execution by switching 
between EPT structures.  
 MR prevents illegal access attempts by 
redirecting them to the fake data and 
restoring EPT settings after each access.  
 MR skips legal access to the memory. 
 MR isolates code and allocated memory of 
third-party drivers, which are loaded after 
it.  
Some important details of the implementation 
details of MemoryRanger are presented in next 
Section.  
3.2. Architecture and Implementation of 
MemoryRanger 
MemoryRanger is a bare-metal hypervisor, which 
is based on hardware virtualization technology 
VT-x and Extended Page Table (EPT) feature. 
MemoryRanger hypervisor is loaded using the 
console application, which starts its legacy driver.  
To implement the algorithm from Section 3.1. 
MemoryRanger needs to process the following:  
 starting new processes;  
 loading drivers;  
 memory allocation and deallocation;  
 read/write and execute EPT violations.  
To process these events MemoryRanger includes 
the following parts, see Figure 4:  
 Kernel-mode driver with callbacks to be 
notified about new drivers and processes;  
 DdiMon hypervisor, which hooks kernel-
mode memory management routines;  
 MemoryMonRWX hypervisor, which 
handles EPT violations and EPT structures;  
 Memory Access Policy (MAP), which is a 
kind of brain for processing all the events.  
For each of the following notifications: drivers 
loading, launching processes, memory allocation 
and deallocation, MemoryRanger adds the 
corresponding data structures to the lists, and 
updates EPT structures.  
The first component is a kernel-mode driver, which 
registers two driver-supplied callback routines 
using PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx and 
PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine to receive 
notifications about processes creation (MSDN, 
2018-a) and drivers loading (MSDN, 2018-b).  
Whenever a process is created the corresponding 
callback routine creates the structure 
EPROCESS_PID and sends it to the MAP. This 
structure includes two fields:  
 process ID;  
 vector of addresses and sizes of 
EPROCESS memory regions, which are 
needed to be protected.  
MAP adds this structure to the list and updates EPT 
structures using MemoryMonRWX hypervisor. 
In a similar way, another callback routine receives 
notifications about drivers loading. After a new 
driver is loaded, this callback creates the 
ISOLATED_MEM_ENCLAVE structure and 
sends it to the MAP. Here is this structure:  
 address of newly allocated EPT paging 
structure for this driver;  
 driver’s image base address;  
 driver’s image end address, which is a sum 
of base address and image size;  
 vector of allocated memory pools.  
MAP adds the ISOLATED_MEM_ENCLAVE to 
the corresponding list, creates a new EPT paging 
structure and updates all other EPT structures.  
The second component processes kernel APIs. 
MemoryRanger considers that third-party drivers 
allocate memory using ExAllocatePoolWithTag 
routine and free using ExFreePoolWithTag. 
MemoryRanger intercepts these kernel API calls 
using DdiMon. It is a hypervisor-based project, 
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which leverages EPT facilities to install stealth 
hooks by Tanda (2016).  
DdiMon receives a notification about memory 
allocation and sends this data to the MAP: 
 address of code, which allocates the buffer; 
 address and size of allocated memory pool. 
MAP receives it and creates the 
ALLOCATED_POOL structure. Next MAP finds 
ISOLATED_MEM_ENCLAVE structure 
corresponding to the driver, which allocates this 
memory, and adds ALLOCATED_POOL into the 
vector ‘drv_allocs’ from this structure. Finally, 
MAP updates EPT structures to take into account a 
newly allocated memory buffer.  
In a similar way, DdiMon processes memory 
deallocation and removes ALLOCATED_POOL 
structure. This scheme helps to supply up-to-date 
information about which memory pools have been 
allocated by which driver.  
The third component is MemoryMonRWX (Korkin 
& Tanda, 2017), which controls access to the 
memory in real time. This hypervisor-based 
component handles read, write, and execute 
violations and sends the following data about each 
EPT violation to the MAP: 
 the current value of EPT pointer;  
 source address (which code tries to access);  
 destination address (which data is 
accessed);  
 type of access (read, write, or execute).  
The final component is MAP, which receives this 
data and makes the decision using the lists of 
EPROCESS_PID, ISOLATED_MEM_ENCLAVE, 
ALLOCATED_POOL. MAP will then grant, or 
will prevent memory access, or will change EPT 
pointer according to the algorithm, see Figure 3.  
MemoryRanger is developed using Microsoft 
Visual C++ 2015 with integrated Windows Driver 
Kit (WDK). It is tested using Vmware Workstation 
14 and Windows 10 1709 64-bit. The source code 
of MemoryRanger is found here Korkin (2018-b). 
Demos. The proposed MemoryRanger architecture 
implements all steps to isolate drivers’ execution 
and it has been successfully tested in two scenarios. 
In the first demo, MemoryRanger protects both 
code and allocated data of third-party drivers from 
illegal access. In the second scenario, 
MemoryRanger prevents privilege escalation attack 
(Korkin, 2018-c).  
The next section will cover the benchmark 
assessment results of MemoryRanger.  
 
Figure 4 MemoryRanger Architecture with four parts: the driver, DdiMon, MemoryMonRWX, and MAP 
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3.3. Benchmark Results 
This section covers the benchmark results of 
MemoryRanger and compares them with the 
AllMemPro, which is the nearest competitor. 
The benchmark was evaluated in the following 
way. A driver allocates memory buffer and 
measures the duration of memory access to the data 
using Time Stamp Counter (TSC).  
The benchmark was calculated in four cases: 
 without hypervisor with enabled memory 
cache;  
 without hypervisor and disabled cache;  
 with AllMemPro hypervisor;  
 with MemoryRanger hypervisor. 
The calculated values of average memory access 
latency and its deviation are presented in Table 2. 
All the details related to the number of 
measurements and calculations are here Korkin 
(2018-a).  
The first three cases are similar with my previous 
research see Korkin (2018-a).  
The nearest competitor of MemoryRanger is 
AllMemPro (Korkin, 2018-a). It uses only one EPT 
structure to protect allocated data and traps both 
types of access attempts: legal and illegal ones. As 
a result, each memory access attempt causes 
significant time degradation.  
MemoryRanger excludes this drawback by using 
separate EPT structures for each driver. This helps 
to trap only illegal access and skip the legal ones, 
whose latency values are measured during 
benchmark.  
MemoryRanger is about three times faster than the 
nearest competitor, and it is slower by half than the 
OS without hypervisor with disabled cache. 
This time degradation happens for two reasons:  
 During the time measurement the OS 
schedule is switching EPT pointer between 
the EPT for Driver X and the Default EPT. 
 The changing EPT pointer results in TLB 
flushing and further memory access 
requires page-walk, which is time 
consuming.  
The first one is based on the fact that Windows is a 
preemptive multitasking OS and cannot be avoided.  
The second issue with the TLB flushing can be 
partially mitigated. The authors of EPTI hypervisor 
show that it is possible to speed up hypervisor by 
avoiding TLB flush after changing EPT pointer. 
This idea will be checked in further research.  
I can conclude that MemoryRanger has good 
benchmark results and these results can be 
improved.  
3.4. Discussion and Limitations 
MemoryRanger is a proof of concept prototype and 
has several limitations. 
MemoryRanger has similar limitations with 
AllMemPro developed by Korkin (2018-a):  
 Indirect memory access;  
 Self-protection;  
 Protection of memory with shared access;  
 Page file mechanism and forcing page-out;  
 Direct access to the physical memory;  
 Joint work with Windows 10 UEFI version;  
 SGX technology and Virtual Secure Mode.  
One of them is the protection of data buffers, which 
have to be accessed from both user-mode and 
kernel-mode code, for example IRP and MDL data. 
MemoryRanger does not protect this data.  
Table 2 Time evaluation 
No. Cases Memory Access Latency, TSC ticks 
1 without hypervisor with enabled cache 70±2 
2 without hypervisor with disabled cache 100.000±4.000 
3 with AllMemPro by Korkin (2018-a) 500.000±10.000 
4  with MemoryRanger 170.000±7.000 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
To sum up I would like to highlight the following:  
1. Windows OS kernel is vulnerable to 
malware attacks and security researchers 
are trying to fill this gap.  
2. MemoryRanger protects kernel-mode code 
and allocated data from illegal access by 
executing drivers in separate enclaves.  
3. MemoryRanger provides confidentiality 
and integrity for the memory of third-party 
drivers and the OS internal structures.  
4. MemoryRanger achieves a low 
performance overhead due to allocating a 
kernel-mode enclave for each driver.  
5. MemoryRanger is a hypervisor-based 
solution with flexible architecture, which 
does not require the drivers’ source code.  
5. FUTURE STEPS 
MemoryRanger is a very promising project and 
here are my five steps for its future development.  
5.1. Spectre and Meltdown Attacks 
MemoryRanger seems to prevent data leakage from 
kernel-mode via side channel attacks based on 
hardware vulnerabilities such as Meltdown attacks 
presented by Lipp et.al. (2018).  
To prevent Meltdown attack, MemoryRanger can 
isolate user-mode and kernel-mode spaces by 
allocating additional EPT paging structures for user 
space, like EPTI (Hua et.el., 2018), and encrypt 
memory pages with sensitive data, like HyperCrypt 
by Götzfried et.al. (2016).  
MemoryRanger can isolate user-mode data from 
being stolen or modified by kernel-mode malware.  
5.2. Restriction of OS Kernel to Prevent 
Exploitation  
There are several hypervisor-based projects, which 
do not restrict OS kernel, for example LKMG. As a 
result, after malware exploits OS kernel core 
vulnerability, it can access sensitive data in 
memory. 
MemoryRanger can restrict the OS kernel core. The 
current version of MemoryRanger allocates a 
separate EPT paging structures for each driver, 
which includes the OS kernel code and the 
corresponding driver’s code. The OS kernel code 
can be restricted by excluding it from the driver’s 
EPT, after the driver has been loaded.  
5.3. Next Areas for Drivers Isolation:  
File System, Registry, Network, Devices  
Windows security does not prevent illegal access 
from kernel-mode drivers to the file system, 
registry, and network. As a result, a malware driver 
can read/write/modify, create/delete files, registry 
and network data, which are processed by user-
mode applications or other drivers. Also, a malware 
driver can access camera, microphone, and other 
devices in an unauthorized way.  
MemoryRanger can implement the corresponding 
access rules to isolate file system, registry, network, 
and devices from being accessed by malware 
drivers. 
5.4. Creating Access Rules from  
Drivers’ Source Code During Compilation  
The current version of MemoryRanger does not 
provide security shared access to the memory. As a 
result, only the driver, which allocates the data, can 
access it. One of the possible ways to tackle this 
issue is to generate memory access rules using the 
drivers’ source code. 
MemoryRanger can use memory access policies, 
which are generated during the drivers’ 
compilation. Usually, drivers, which allocate data 
for shared access, are compiled in the same 
environment, for example, one Visual Studio 
solution includes two projects with such drivers. 
5.5. Integrate into Windows Kernel  
Finally, by integrating MemoryRanger into 
Windows OS kernel, we can significantly improve 
data protection from both software and hardware 
attacks. It is time to take a step forward and protect 
data of more than one billion Windows users all 
around the world.  
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